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…the process of negotiating, drafting, adopting and enforcing the CRPD 
has been a relatively quick one. Despite these happy developments, 
persons with disabilities are continually informed that their expectations 
from the United Nation system were naïve and unreal.1 
   
How has India fared in realizing the rights of disabled persons under the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(‘CRPD’)?2 Have their expectations remained naïve and unreal or has the 
municipal law grappled with the CRPD to enforce disability rights in a real 
and meaningful way? This chapter seeks to examine this issue from the 
standpoint of Indian case law. The purpose is to offer an overview of how 
the appellate courts in India are using and interpreting the CRPD. In doing 
so, the chapter does not seek to justify any of the approaches adopted by the 
courts but performs an explanatory role in understanding the judicial 
discourse on the CRPD. What emerges from this exercise is a variety of 
ways in which the CRPD has been invoked—some modest, some 
substantial, but all useful and unique in understanding the judicial terrain at 
the crossroads of disability rights, constitutional law and international law.  
 
2. Indian Legal System and its Position in International Law 
 
The Constitution of India establishes a dual polity of the Union (Central) 
Government and Governments of individual States. Article 1 of the 
Constitution thus proclaims that: ‘India is a Union of States’. In assessing 
the qualitative dimensions of this relationship, the Supreme Court has 
consistently held that the Constitution adopts only a ‘watered down’ version 
                                                 
1 Amita Dhanda, ‘Constructing a New Human Rights Lexicon: Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities’ (2008) 5 Sur International Journal on Human Rights Online 
<http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?pid=S1806-64452008000100003&script=sci_arttext&tlng=en#tx04> 
(accessed 10 January 2016) (quoting Andrew Byrnes, ‘Convention on Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ 
(1-3 September 2006) presentation made at the Critical Legal Studies Conference at NALSAR University 
of Law, Hyderabad India. 
2 999 UNTS 3 (opened for signature 30 March 2007; entered into force 3 May 2008). 
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of federalism.3 On the other hand, leading constitutional law scholars like 
HM Seervai and MP Jain have argued that ‘the federal principle is dominant 
in our Constitution4 such that India follows a ‘flexible, federal system and 
co-operative federalism’.5 This is because, even though the legislative and 
executive powers have been elaborately divided between the Union and the 
States, in the form of the Union List (List I), the State List (List II) and a 
shared Concurrent List (List III) under the Constitution, the Union maintains 
some residuary powers in relation to all unenumerated matters (Entry 97, 
List I; Article 248(1)) and also some overriding powers, especially during 
emergency and war (Articles 352, 356). In fact, in relation to international 
law, it is the Union Executive and Legislature which have the exclusive 
power to enter into international agreements (Articles 73, 246(1) read with 
Entries 13 and 14 of the Union List) and to bring them into force via Article 
253, respectively.  
 
Indian’s position on international law maps closely onto the common law 
tradition of dualism. 6  This is constitutionally recognized in Article 253 
which states that the ‘Parliament has power to make any law for the whole 
or any part of the territory of India for implementing any treaty, agreement 
or convention with any other country or countries or any decision made at 
any international conference, association or other body’. The wording of the 
provision makes clear that it is only the Parliament, and not the individual 
States, which has power to implement international law via a domestic 
enactment, including on matters which are otherwise reserved for individual 
States to legislate upon.7 Thus, even though ‘disability’ is an item earmarked 
for States to legislate upon, the Parliament may rightly legislate upon it 
when giving effect to international commitments under the CRPD or other 
                                                 
3 West Bengal v India AIR 1963 SC 1241 (Supreme Court of India); State of Rajasthan v Union of India 
AIR 1977 SC 1382 (Supreme Court of India); Karnataka v Union of India AIR 1978 SC 68 (Supreme 
Court of India). See also KC Wheare, Federal Government (4th edn, Oxford Paperbacks 1970).  
4 HM Seervai, Constitutional Law of India (4th edn, vol I, NM Tipathi 1991) 303.  
5 MP Jain, Indian Constitutional Law (6th edn, LexisNexis Butterworths Wadhwa 2010) 527.  
6 BS Chimni, ‘International Law Scholarship in Post-colonial India: Coping with Dualism’ (2010) 23 
Leiden Journal of International Law 23.  
7 This is because Article 253 opens as a non-obstante clause: ‘Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing 
provisions of this Chapter…’ See P Chandrasekhara Rao, The Indian Constitution and International Law 
(BRILL 1993) 7. 
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international obligations. 8  The dualist effect of Article 253 means that 
India’s obligations arising from an international agreement cannot be 
enforced in courts until specific legislation is passed by the Parliament 
bringing into force the obligations arising under the agreement.9  
 
But at the same time, Article 51(c) of the Constitution provides that the State 
shall endeavour to ‘foster respect for international law and treaty obligations 
in the dealings of organized peoples with one another’. Whilst Article 51(c) 
is merely a ‘directive principle’ and not a ‘fundamental right’ such that it 
cannot be directly enforced in a court of law; directive principles like Article 
51(c) are still ‘fundamental in the governance of the country’ and it is ‘the 
duty of the State to apply these principles in making laws’.10 Thus, Article 
51(c) not only makes the obligation to implement international law under 
Article 253 a matter of good governance (because it fosters respect for treaty 
obligations); but it also makes space for asserting respect for international 
law and treaty obligations generally, over and beyond the Article 253 
requirement.11 This broad interpretation of Article 51(c) has been aided by 
the fact that directive principles included in Part IV (Articles 36-51) of the 
Constitution have themselves become vital in the enforcement of rights.12 
The culmination of this trend appears in the locus classicus of Vishaka v 
State of Rajasthan.13 The Supreme Court in Vishaka relied on Article 51(c) 
to hold that the legislative gap in addressing sexual harassment against 
women in the workplace could be judicially bridged by relying on India’s 
international obligations under the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW):14 
                                                 
8 Entry 9, State List, Schedule VII, Constitution of India 1950.  
9 Civil Rights Vigilance Committee, SLSRC College of Law, Bangalore v Union of India AIR 1983 Kant 85 
(High Court of Karnataka).  
10 Article 37, Constitution of India 1950. 
11 Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala (1973) 4 SCC 225, 333 (Sikri CJ) (Supreme Court of India).  
12 Francis Coralie v Union Territory of Delhi AIR 1981 SC 746 (Supreme Court of India); Peoples Union 
for Democratic Rights v Union of India AIR 1982 SC 1473 (Supreme Court of India); Olga Tellis v 
Bombay Municipal Corporation AIR 1986 SC 180 (Supreme Court of India); Chemeli Singh v State of UP 
1996(2) SCC 549 (Supreme Court of India); Paschim Banga Khat Mazdoor Samit v State of West Bengal 
(1996) 4 SCC 37 (Supreme Court of India); Consumer Education and Research Centre v Union of India 
(1995) 3 SCC 42 (Supreme Court of India); State of Kerala v N M Thomas (1976) 2 SCC 310 (Supreme 
Court of India).  
13 AIR 1997 SC 3011 (Supreme Court of India). 




In the absence of domestic law occupying the field to formulate effective 
measures to check the evil of sexual harassment of working women at all work 
places, the contents of International Conventions and norms are significant for the 
purpose of interpretation of the guarantee of gender equality, right to work with 
human dignity in Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution and the 
safeguards against sexual harassment implicit therein. Any international 
convention not inconsistent with the fundamental rights and in harmony with its 
[sic] spirit must be read into those provisions to enlarge the meaning and content 
thereof, to promote the object of the Constitutional guarantee. This is implicit 
from Article 51(c) and enabling power of the Parliament to enact laws for 
implementing the International Conventions and norms by virtue of Article 
253…15 
 
This approach – of directly implementing international obligations via 
constitutional interpretation of fundamental rights – in the absence of 
domestic law on the subject or any other conflicting law – has been widely 
accepted by Indian courts since Vishaka.16 Whilst this is a strong statement 
of the potential for the direct use of international law (in sharp contrast with 
India’s dualist roots) international law has been relied upon in a host of 
circumstances other than direct enforcement: in interpreting statutory or 
constitutional provisions; 17  for clarifying ambiguities in law; 18  for its 
persuasive value;19 to enforce customary international law which does not 
conflict with any municipal law—for example, principles like ‘sustainable 
development’, ‘precautionary principle’, ‘polluter pays principle’, and 
‘public trust doctrine’ have been enforced by courts as part of municipal 
law. 20  The Supreme Court in Entertainment Network (I) Ltd v Super 
Cassette Industries21  summarized how international law may be used by 
courts – identifying six categories in particular: 
 
                                                 
15 Vishaka (n 13) [7]. 
16 Liverpool & London SP & I Assn Ltd v MV Sea Success I (2004) 9 SCC 512, 540 (Supreme Court of 
India); Pratap Singh v State of Jharkhand (2005) 3 SCC 551, 578-579 (Supreme Court of India).  
17 Gramophone Co of India Ltd v Birendra Bahadur Pandey (1984) 2 SCC 534 (Supreme Court of India); 
State of West Bengal v Kesoram Industries Ltd (2004) 10 SCC 201 (Supreme Court of India).  
18 This principle was first recognized in the dissenting opinion of Khanna J in ADM, Jabalpur v Shivakant 
Shukla AIR 1976 SC 1207, 1259-1260 (Supreme Court of India), and has been followed in Vellore Citizens 
Welfare Forum v Union of India AIR 1996 SC 2715 (Supreme Court of India). 
19 Selvi v State of Karnataka (2010) 7 SCC 263 (Supreme Court of India).  
20 Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v Union of India AIR 1996 SC 2715 (Supreme Court of India); MC 
Mehta v Kamal Nath 1996 (9) SCALE 141, 161 (Supreme Court of India).  
21 2008 (9) SCALE 69 (Supreme Court of India).  
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(i) as a means of interpretation; (ii) justification or fortification of a stance taken; 
(iii) to fulfill spirit of international obligations which India has entered into, when 
they are not in conflict with the existing domestic law; (iv) to reflect international 
changes and reflect the wider civilization; (v) to provide a remedy contained in a 
covenant, but not in a national law; and (vi) to fill gaps in municipal law.22 
 
As Section 3 below shows, all of these approaches are visible in the use of 
the CRPD by Indian courts. The chief takeaway from this brief 
recapitulation of India’s international law position is that: although the 
thumb rule of dualism under Article 253 continues to operate, courts in India 
have changed the way international law is received and enforced in India; by 
exploring a spectrum of possibilities for engaging with it and thus, going 
beyond the two traditional models of either making international law self-
executing (monism) or only applicable by transformation (dualism).  
 
3. India and the CRPD 
 
India signed the CRPD on 30 March 2007 when it was opened for signature, 
along with 82 other States. It ratified the CRPD on 1 October 2007. The 
Convention came into force on 3 May 2008. With this arose the obligation to 
implement the rights and guarantees enshrined in the CRPD and to bring 
existing laws in conformity with the principles of the Convention.23 Almost 
a decade later, the obligation was discharged on 16 December 2016 when 
the Indian Parliament finally passed the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
Act 2016 (‘RPD Act’) replacing the existing Persons with Disabilities 
(Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act 1995 
(‘PWD Act’). This process of harmonizing the existing law with the CRPD 
has been a lengthy one.24 It was only in May 2010 that the Ministry of Social 
Justice and Empowerment appointed an Expert Committee to draft a 
comprehensive new law. The Expert Committee in turn appointed a Legal 
Consultant, Prof Amita Dhanda, Head of the Centre for Disability Studies, 
NALSAR University of Law, Hyderabad, to lead the process of legal 
                                                 
22 Ibid 92. 
23 Articles 26 and 27, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1155 UNTS 331 (opened for signature 23 
May 1969; entered into force 27 January 1980); Articles 51(c) and 253 of the Constitution of India 1950. 
24 Amita Dhanda and Rajive Raturi (eds), ‘Harmonizing Laws with the UNCRPD’ (May 2010) 
<https://d3gqux9sl0z33u.cloudfront.net/AA/AG/chrusp- biz/downloads/113311/Harmonizing_Laws.pdf> 
accessed 10 January 2016.  
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drafting and reform. The Rights of Persons with Disabilities Bill 2011 was 
drafted after extensive deliberations and nation-wide consultations, and was 
submitted by the Ministry to the Parliament for consideration in 2012.25 But 
the 2012 version was substantially different and diluted as compared to the 
2011 draft law.26 In fact, since then the bill went through several rounds of 
revisions in 2013 and 2014, all reflecting a position inferior than that 
adopted in the draft before.27  The most last version, the 2014 Bill, was 
introduced in the Rajya Sabha (the Upper House of the Parliament) on 7 
February 2014 and considered by the Standing Committee on Social Justice 
and Empowerment since 16 September 2014.28 The 2014 Bill was widely 
criticized for its ‘complete lack of understanding of the approach of the 
[CRPD]’29 and failure to adopt the CRPD’s social model of disability within 
a human rights rather than welfare framework. In contrast the social model 
was duly embraced in the 2011 draft Bill.30 But it was the 2014 Bill which – 
after several more rounds of amendments – was finally passed in the form of 
RPD Act 2016. The new legislation is a marked improvement over the PWD 
Act 1995 with its adoption of several of the rights and obligations under the 
CRPD especially in relation to equality and non-discrimination, legal 
capacity, reasonable accommodation, accessibility and universal design. It 
is, however, far from a comprehensive effort embracing the CRPD. For 
                                                 
25 For a complete history of drafting and justification of the 2011 draft bill, see Centre for Disability 
Studies, ‘Law and Policy Reform: The Rights of Persons with Disabilities Bill 2011’ 
<http://www.disabilitystudiesnalsar.org/index.php> accessed 10 January 2016. 
26  For comparisons between the two drafts see 
<https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B64fpIIJNZL8TFNzRHJmOW85cjg/edit?pli=1> accessed 10 January 
2016.  
27  Amita Dhanda, ‘A Retrograde and Incoherent Law’ (6 February 2014) < 
http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-opinion/a-retrograde-and-incoherent-law/article5658595.ece> 
accessed 10 January 2016; ‘Disability Bill flawed: NALSAR’ Express News: Hyderabad (6 February 2014) 
<http://www.newindianexpress.com/cities/hyderabad/Disability-Bill-flawed-
NALSAR/2014/02/06/article2040975.ece> accessed 10 January 2016. 
28 For differences between the PWD Act, 2011 draft bill and the 2014 bill, see PRS Legislative Research, 
Legislative Brief on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Bill, 2014 (20 February 2015) at p 6 
<http://www.prsindia.org/uploads/media/Person%20with%20Disabilities/Legislative%20Brief%20%20-
%20Disabilities%202014.pdf> accessed 10 January 2016.  
29 Amba Salelkar, ‘On The Draft Rights of Persons with Disabilities Bill, 2014, as cleared by Cabinet’ 
Inclusive Planet Centre for Disability Law and Policy (26 January 2014) 
<http://inclusiveplanet.org.in/sites/default/files/Inclusive%20Planet%20Analysis%20of%20the%20Rights
%20of%20Persons%20with%20Disabilities%20Bill%202014%2026.01.2014.pdf> accessed 10 January 
2016. 
30 Ashish Bharadwaj and Saptarshi Mandal, ‘The Rights of Persons with Disabilities Bill, 2014’ (2015) 1 




example, the RPD Act still relies on a specific list of recognized disabilities 
enumerated in the Schedule of the Act. Although it has enlarged the gamut 
of disabilities recognized from 7 to 21, including disability due to acid 
attacks, thalassemia, haemophilia, dwarfism, learning disabilities and 
Parkinson’s disease; the list operates in an exhaustive way until amended by 
the government. Private sectors duties remain scarce and employment quota 
(reservation) for disabled persons has been raised only marginally from 3% 
to 4%. The real potential of the RPD Act will thus be revealed in its eventual 
interpretation and implementation in the coming years.  
 
But as this chapter shows, appellate courts in India may already have laid 
down the groundwork for this. In the decade between the ratification and 
implementation of the CRPD via a new comprehensive legislation (2007-
2016), courts continued to engage the CRPD in disability-related matters in 
light of existing laws, including the now-repealed PWD Act, the Mental 
Health Act 1987, the National Trust for the Welfare of Persons with Autism, 
Cerebral Palsy, Mental Retardation and Multiple Disabilities Act 1999 and 
the Rehabilitation Council of India Act 1992. The next two sections of this 
chapter traverse the judicial landscape which has grappled with the CRPD 
obligations and draws out the tentative implications which can be deduced 
from this engagement.  
 
4. Indian Judicial Discourse on the CRPD 
 
The survey of Indian courts’ engagement with the CRPD yields peculiar 
results. In terms of the breadth or volume of cases, the results are moderate; 
but in terms of the approaches preferred by the justices in these cases, the 
diversity is striking. This section seeks to map out the multifarious 
approaches adopted by Indian courts in using the CRPD. It is divided into 
two parts—Section 4.1 explains the basis of selection and organization of 
cases discussed in this chapter; and Section 4.2 thematically analyzes the 
case law in depth to help understand and distinguish the ways in which the 
CRPD is invoked.  
 




The search for cases for the purposes of this chapter was performed on the 
leading online legal database Manupatra. The search terms included the 
‘Convention on Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ and ‘CRPD’. The search 
was confined to appellate level courts only—i.e. the Supreme Court of India 
and the 24 State High Courts. Thus, lower (district) court cases and special 
tribunals were excluded from consideration. There are two reasons for this. 
First, at a practical level, the text of lower court judgments are not made 
available on online legal databases like Manupatra.31 Secondly, even if they 
were to be sought out and examined, they may not provide the relevant 
fodder for the present inquiry. As Hedge rightly points out, lower courts—
either ordinary or specialized, seldom refer to substantive norms of 
international law:  
 
International law, it should be noted, remains an exotic, yet persuasive, legal tool 
for Indian courts, and is usually invoked at the level of high courts and the 
Supreme Court, although the lower judiciary gets to invoke some elements of 
international law and foreign law at the procedural level.32  
 
Thus, though lower courts with ordinary jurisdiction may be dealing with 
disability issues such as under the PWD Act, they may not be dealing with 
them squarely within the framework of international obligations. Since 
international norms have been enforced primarily through constitutional 
rights (per Vishaka), it is strategic to focus on the enforcement of the CRPD 
by focussing on constitutional adjudication.33 Articles 226 and 32 of the 
Constitution empower the High Courts and the Supreme Court respectively 
to hear cases involving breach of ‘fundamental rights’ enshrined in Part III 
of the Constitution. Further, given the record of ‘judicial activism’ in cases 
of public interest litigation under Articles 32 and 226, rights jurisprudence 
                                                 
31  The exception would be the Delhi district courts judgments which are available on the website 
Indiakanoon.  
32 VG Hegde, ‘Indian Courts and International Law’ (2010) 23 Leiden Journal of International Law 53, 56.  
33 See for a similar logic followed in some of the leading writings on emerging disability jurisprudence in 
India: Kalpana Kannabiran, ‘Discrimination and the Standard Measures of Diversity’ in Tools of Justice: 
Non-Discrimination and the Indian Constitution (Routledge 2012) part II; Renu Addlakha and Saptarshi 
Mandal, ‘Disability Law in India: Paradigm Shift or Evolving Discourse?’ (2009) 44 Economic and 
Political Weekly 62. 
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has been particularly thriving at this level.34 The choice of narrowing down 
to High Courts and the Supreme Court thus streamlines the raw material for 
the purposes of this chapter in a suitable way.  
 
The search returned twenty-eight cases in total—out of which three were 
Supreme Court cases and twenty-six of them High Court cases from 
Telangana and Andhra Pradesh (1), Bombay (3), Delhi (9), Gujarat (3), 
Kerala (1), Madras (4), Orissa (2), Punjab and Haryana (1), and Rajasthan 
(1).35 These cases demonstrate varied ways in which the litigating parties or 
the court have referred to the CRPD. The case analysis can be divided into 
two broad themes of ‘citation’ and ‘interpretation’. Within the first 
approach, the CRPD is merely cited by the parties before the court, by the 
judges themselves or by both. In this set of cases, the reference to the CRPD 
is a limited one, made in one of five ways—(i) the CRPD is cited as the legal 
basis of the claim; (ii) another court’s reference to the CRPD is mentioned; 
(iii) only the fact that India is a State Party to the CRPD is mentioned; (iv) 
the CRPD is cited with no particular point of reference; (v) the CRPD is 
wrongly cited as being given effect to in the pre-CRPD legislation, the PWD 
Act. The fact of mere citation in these five ways means that the parties or the 
courts did not in fact use the CRPD text in a substantial way. By contrast, 
the second approach of ‘interpretation’36  involves the courts’ use of the 
CRPD which goes beyond mere citation to interpreting it in either of the two 
ways—(i) by substantially and directly relying on the CRPD as forming the 
legal basis of the claim, especially where there is a gap in the law; (ii) using 
the CRPD to bolster the court’s reasoning or confirm the stance taken by the 
court. These approaches are teased out discursively in the discussion below.  
 
It is useful to note that the case analysis is based only on the text of the 
judgments and no case briefs or rejoinders filed by the parties have been 
perused. Even though these materials are relevant in understanding the 
                                                 
34 See SP Sathe, ‘Judicial Activism: The Indian Experience’ (2001) 29 Washington University Journal of 
Law and Policy 29. 
35 The number reflects the cases found within the search parameters described above and not necessarily the 
true number of cases because they were either not available online or were not returned in the search.  
36 See the idea of interpretation of international law by domestic courts André Nollkaemper, National 
Courts and the International Rule of Law (Oxford University Press 2011),  
 
 10 
background and context of a claim, the inability to access them because they 
are not made readily available precludes their consideration.  
 
Three further points must be borne in mind in the following discussion. 
First, not all rights cases decided by the higher judiciary come with a 
coherent and comprehensive justification for the courts’ final orders.37 This 
‘spirit of adventure’38 embraced by the courts in adjudicating human rights 
cases in an enabling but not necessarily explicable way, characterizes 
disability jurisprudence as well.39 The judgments considered in this chapter 
are similarly patchy in offering lucid reasons for invoking international law. 
Where possible, this gap is filled by reasonable deduction but it is useful to 
bear in mind both the relative brevity of the judgments and often their lack 
of an explanation of ‘how’ and ‘why’ the CRPD is used. Secondly, where 
the case analysis does not mention any specific provision of the CRPD, it 
means that the court did not in fact quote any provision specifically and 
quoted the CRPD only in general terms. Thirdly, as may be clear from the 
thematic layout above, the discussion of cases does not follow a 
chronological order but a format which helps explain the individual 
approaches of the courts. Table 1 below, chronologically lists the details of 
the cases considered in this chapter. 
                                                 
37 See generally Upendra Baxi, ‘Taking Suffering Seriously: Social Action Litigation in the Supreme Court 
of India’, in Jagga Kapur (ed), Supreme Court on Public Interest Litigation (vol I, LIPS Publications 1998). 
38  Philip Alston, ‘Foreword’ in Malcolm Langford, Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in 
International and Comparative Law (Cambridge University Press 2009) ix. 
39  See Rumi Ahmed, Rights of Persons with Disability in India (CreateSpace Independent Publishing 
Platform 2015); Jayna Kothari, The Future of Disability Law in India (Oxford University Press 2012).  
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TABLE 1: CASE LIST 
 Case Court Date Decided Use 
(Cited/Interpreted) 
CRPD Articles 
1.  Ranjit Kumar Rajak v State Bank of India High Court of Bombay 08.05.2009 Interpreted 2 and 27 
2.  Suchita Srivastava v Chandigarh 
Administration 
Supreme Court of India 28.08.2009 Cited -  
3.  R Parthiban v State of Tamilnadu High Court of Madras 30.10.2009 Applied 12 
4. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v 
Shrirang Anandrao Jadhav 
High Court of Mumbai 11.11.2009 Interpreted Preamble, 1, 4, 27 
5.  Lalit v Government of NCT High Court of Delhi 07.05.2010 Interpreted 7, 9, 24 
6.  National Association of The Deaf through its 
Joint Secretary v Union of India 
High Court of Delhi 14.02.2011 Cited - 
7.  Laxmikant Vijayvargia v Bharat Heavy 
Electricals Limited 
High Court of Delhi 04.04.2011 Cited - 
8.  E Murugan v The General Manager 
(Operation) Metropolitan Transport 
Corporation Ltd 
High Court of Madras 26.0 
4.2011 
Cited - 
9.  Management of DAV Public School v State of 
Orissa 
High Court of Orissa 27.06.2011 Cited - 
10.  Rajpal v Delhi Transport Corporation High Court of Delhi 04.08.2011 Wrongly Cited - 
11. National Association of the Deaf v Union of 
India 
High Court of Delhi 24.11.2011 Interpreted - 
12.  Social Jurist, A Civil Rights Group v 
Government of NCT of Delhi 
High Court of Delhi 05.09.2012 Cited - 
13.  DS Chauhan v Railway Board, Ministry of 
Railways 
High Court of Delhi 15.10.2012 Cited  20 
14.  Akbari Kaushik Hansrajbhai v State of Gujarat High Court of Gujarat 01.11.2012 Cited  27 
15.  Sambhavana v University of Delhi Supreme Court of India 29.05.2013 Interpreted 24 
16.  Saravanan v Secretary to Government High Court of Madras 25.06.2013 Cited 3 and 29 
17. Vibhu Dayal Sharma v Director High Court of Punjab and 
Haryana 
02.07.2013 Interpreted - 
18. Dr Syed Abdul Wahab Abdul Aziz v State of 
Maharashtra 
High Court of Bombay 03.09.2013 Cited 24 




20. Pramod Arora v Hon’ble Lt Governor of Delhi High Court of Delhi 03.04.2014 Cited - 
21. V Palani v Management of Metropolitan 
Transport Corporation (Chennai) Ltd 
High Court of Madras 04.06.2014 Interpreted 2(i)-(k), 2(m), 2(o)-(p), 2(t), 
2(w), 4(d), 15(2), 17 
22. Tushar Keshaorao Deshmukh v Union of India High Court of Delhi 13.10.2014 Wrongly Cited 2 
23. Susanta Kumar Sahoo v Union of India High Court of Orissa 04.12.2014 Cited - 
24. P Geetha v Kerala Livestock Development 
Board Ltd 
High Court of Kerala 06.01.2015 Cited - 
25. Desh Deepak Dhamija v Union Bank of India High Court of Rajasthan 14.01.2015 Interpreted 2 and 27 
26. Rajesh Motibhai Desai v State of Gujarat High Court of Gujarat 09.07.2015 Cited 12 
27. M Venkateswarlu v Andhra Pradesh State 
Road Transport Corporation 
High Court of Telangana 
and Andhra Pradesh 
29.01.2016 Interpreted Preamble, 2, 4, 27 
28. Jeeja Ghosh v Union of India Supreme Court of India 12.05.16 Interpreted 5 and 9 
 
 13 




The number of cases which seem to have ‘simply cited’ the CRPD is 
seventeen, which is a considerable proportion of the twenty-eight cases 
returned in the search. Citations have appeared either on behalf of the 
parties, the courts themselves or from both. Five approaches emerge from 
these citations.  
 
First, in three of the cases, the courts mentioned that the CRPD had been 
given effect through the PWD Act—which is wholly incorrect since the 
PWD Act is a piece of pre-CRPD legislation which was enacted in 1995, 
seventeen years before the CRPD came into force.40 In fact, the PWD Act 
was adopted to give effect to the Proclamation on the Full Participation 
and Equality of People with Disabilities in the Asian and Pacific region, 
to which India is a signatory. Further analysis of these incorrect citations 
in the three cases yields no significant results.  
 
Secondly, the CRPD has been cited by the parties, the court or both as 
forming the basis of the claim. This seems to be the position in the 
remaining fourteen decisions. In four out of the fourteen, only the 
Petitioner relied upon the CRPD as the legal basis of the claim. This was 
not picked up by the justices later or considered in the court’s reasoning. 
For example in Saravanan v Secretary to Government,41 the Madras High 
Court considered a challenge to Section 34(i) of the Tamil Nadu Co-
operative Societies Act 1983 which was contended as prohibiting blind 
candidates from running for positions on the Board of Directors of co-
operative societies. According to the said rule, anyone who could not read 
and write Tamil or English or such other working language stipulated by 
the government was disqualified from contesting the elections. The 
Petitioners argued that the prohibition was ‘directly in contravention of 
the [CRPD]’ on the basis that:  
 
                                                 
40  Rajpal v Delhi Transport Corporation (2012) ILLJ 529 Del (High Court of Delhi); Yusufbhai 
Hatimbhai Kachwala v Municipal Commissioner 2014 GLH(3) 472 (High Court of Gujarat); Tushar 
Keshaorao Deshmukh v Union of India 2014 (146) DRJ 23 (High Court of Delhi).  
41 (2013) 6 MLJ 708 (High Court of Madras).  
 
 14 
 Article 3…ensure[s] non-discrimination, full and effective participation and 
inclusion in society, equal opportunity and for acceptance of persons with 
disabilities as part of human diversity and humanity…[and] Article 29 of the 
Convention, [obliges] the States…to [guarantee] persons with disabilities 
political rights and the opportunity to enjoy them on an equal basis with 
others, which includes the right of the persons with disabilities to stand for 
election.42  
  
The Court found the case to be unmeritorious since the Petitioners were 
disqualified from the elections not on the basis of visual impairment but 
because they were illiterate.43 In relation to the validity of the legislative 
disqualification, it held that the plain language of the provision did not in 
fact bar blind candidates but only those who were illiterate.44 Given this, 
it did not go on to examine the case in light of the provisions of the 
CRPD because the literal interpretation of the disqualification did not 
squarely touch upon disability. Similarly, in Pramod Arora v Hon’ble Lt 
Governor of Delhi,45 the Petitioners relied upon the CRPD as forming the 
legal basis of their claim along with the PWD Act. The claim involved a 
challenge to the amendment to Section 2(d) of the Right to Education Act 
2009 (RTE Act) on the basis that it put disabled children at a 
disadvantage by defining ‘child belonging to disadvantaged group’ as 
including disabled children. This meant that disabled children had to 
compete within the 25% quota earmarked for the general category of 
‘child belonging to disadvantaged group’ under Section 12(l) of the RTE 
Act; instead of a separate 3% quota guaranteed under Section 26 of the 
PWD Act which mandated the government to provide access to free 
education in an appropriate environment to permit the integration of 
disabled children. In being clumped together with other disadvantaged 
students, the Petitioners claimed that the needs of their disabled children 
were neglected as regards accessibility, integration and providing an 
enabling environment. The Petitioners thus argued that: 
 
 all schools must therefore provide for [disabled children], as the right to 
inclusive education is a right guaranteed to them under the PWD Act and 
according to the [CRPD]…all schools must keep 3% seats for [disabled 
children] and also at the same time upgrade their infrastructure and 
                                                 
42 Ibid [6]. 
43 Ibid [13]. 
44 Ibid [35].  
45 (2014) X AD (Delhi) 241 (High Court of Delhi). 
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preparedness to handle such children [because] [t]he [CRPD] guarantees to 
them non-discrimination on the basis of their disability.46 
 
After a complex constitutional analysis, the Court found that the 25% 
quota must provide for a sub-classification for disabled children to ensure 
that their right to 3% reservation is not diluted.47 In light of the abysmal 
conditions of admitting and integrating disabled children in primary 
schools,48 the Court further went on to propose an elaborate admission 
and reporting mechanism for disabled children in primary and 1st grade, 
i.e. entry level classes. The wide scope of this order is not unusual. Social 
rights adjudication, including and especially in right to education cases, 
often involves complex remedial orders in the form of structural 
interdicts and other such ‘open’ remedies.49 But despite this very broad 
order, the Court’s reasoning did not pan beyond constitutional and 
legislative commitments and no use of the CRPD was made in the 
judicial analysis.  
 
Likewise, in Social Jurist, A Civil Rights Group v Government of NCT of 
Delhi,50 the Petitioners requested the appointment of Special Educators 
and barrier free access in recognized unaided and aided private schools in 
Delhi. They grounded the claim in a slew of legal provisions including 
the CRPD: 
 
the failure on the part of these schools to have adequate physical and academic 
infrastructure in place for the education of the children with disabilities has 
resulted in violation of [RTE Act] of such children as guaranteed under 
Articles 14, 15, 21, 21-A & 38 of the Constitution of India read with the 
provisions of Delhi School Education Act, 1973, [PWD Act] [and] the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) and [the CRPD].51 
 
The High Court of Delhi held that the appointment of two Special 
Educators was mandatory and not dependent on the admission of disabled 
children in need of them and the right to education of disabled children 
included all kind of facilities to provide for their inclusion and integration 
                                                 
46 Ibid [8]. 
47 Ibid [50]. 
48 Ibid [53]. 
49 See Aruna Sathanapally, Beyond Disagreement: Open Remedies for Human Rights Adjudication 
(Oxford University Press 2012). 
50 (2012) ILR 6 Delhi 308 (High Court of Delhi).  
51 Ibid [1]. 
 
 16 
in schools. Despite the favourable outcome, the Court did not rely on the 
CRPD in reaching its conclusion. As Section 4.2.2. shows, Pramod Arora 
and Social Jurist lie in sharp contrast with other right to education cases 
which have used the CRPD much more substantively.52 Much the same 
can be said of the approach of the Gujarat High Court in Akbari Kaushik 
Hansrajbhai v State of Gujarat53 where the Petitioner invoked Article 27 
of the CRPD to claim his right to work having been denied appointment 
as a blind language teacher. 54  The claim under Article 27 was left 
unaccounted for in the Court’s analysis where the Petitioner ultimately 
obtained relief under the PWD Act. 
 
The court may itself cite the CRPD without being prompted by the parties 
before the court. In Susanta Kumar Sahoo v Union of India,55 the High 
Court of Orissa merely cited the CRPD in connection with the general 
proposition that there is a right to education for disabled children under 
the Convention. This was repeated in Management of DAV Public School 
v State of Orissa56 in relation to disabled children’s right to education. 
However, the courts have made no further reference or use of the CRPD 
generally or Article 24 specifically. In Rajesh Motibhai Desai v State of 
Gujarat,57 the reference to the CRPD was a bit more substantial in that 
the High Court of Gujarat noted the shift from a welfare to human rights 
model of disability brought about by the CRPD.58 
 
There are two cases where the CRPD has been relied upon both by the 
Petitioner and the court as forming the legal basis of the claim. DS 
Chauhan v Railway Board, Ministry of Railways59 involved a challenge 
to the policy of Indian railways which provided concessions to deaf 
people who cannot speak but did not to deaf people who can speak. The 
Court framed this issue as a question of a violation of the CRPD in the 
introductory paragraph of the case as: ‘whether the railway has an 
                                                 
52 See infra Section 4.2.2 and Section 5.1.  
53 (2013) ILLJ 637 Guj (High Court of Gujarat).  
54 Ibid [10]. 
55 Writ Petition (Civil) No. 12807 of 2013 (decided on 4 December 2014) (High Court of Orissa). 
56 2011(2) ILR-CUT 301 [28] (High Court of Orissa). 
57 2016 LabIC 698 (High Court of Gujarat).  
58 Ibid [49] (‘The Convention marks a shift in viewing disability from a social welfare concern to a 
human rights issue, which involves acknowledging that societal barriers and prejudices are themselves 
disabling.’). 
59 2012(132) DRJ 905 (High Court of Delhi).  
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obligation to all mobility challenged disabled persons under Article 20 of 
the [CRPD] to extend the concession’.60 Despite such a framing of the 
case, the Court went on to evaluate the claim from the standpoint of the 
PWD Act and not under Article 20 of the CRPD. It found that although 
Article 20 obliged the States to take effective measures to ensure personal 
mobility of disabled persons to the greatest extent possible, this standard 
was already fulfilled by the Railways when considered in light of the 
existing obligations under the PWD Act, and thus Article 20 did not 
create a separate right or standard for the Petitioner to claim under. 
Whilst both sides refer to the CRPD, the text of the judgment shows only 
peripheral engagement with it by both the Petitioner and the Court. A 
second example of this is the case of National Association of the Deaf 
through its Joint Secretary v Union of India.61 The National Association 
of the Deaf challenged the complete ban on deaf persons from obtaining 
driving licenses. They used ‘the [CRPD] which was ratified by India in 
October, 2007 to pyramid the contention that a person who has an 
international driving licence can drive in India and a deaf person in India 
if goes abroad can get an international driving licence and would be 
eligible to drive in India whereas he is not entitled to get a driving licence 
[in India]’.62 The Petitioner argued on the basis of this tension between 
municipal and international law that India’s international commitments 
could not ‘be given an indecent burial in the name of policy making’.63 
The Court noted that the special expert committee constituted by the 
Ministry of Road Transport and Highways had used the CRPD to justify 
the ban. Since the Convention did not specify the level of deafness, there 
was nothing inconsistent with the CRPD in disallowing deaf persons to 
drive without regard to the level of their deafness. 64  Rejecting this 
argument, the Court held that whilst special exceptions for licenses could 
not be granted, even totally deaf persons were eligible to be granted a 
license if they passed the test. Despite the sporadic references to the 
CRPD by the Petitioner and the Court, there is no indication of whether 
the CRPD actually played a concrete role in the reasoning.  
 
                                                 
60 Ibid [1].  
61 2011(2) TAC 824 (High Court of Delhi).  
62 Ibid [4].  
63 Ibid [8]. 
64 Ibid [22].  
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Thirdly, and to an even lesser extent, one court cited the CRPD with 
reference to no point in particular. In Laxmikant Vijayvargia v Bharat 
Heavy Electricals Limited,65 the High Court of Delhi cited the Petitioner 
as having relied upon the PWD Act and the CRPD as the basis of his 
compensation claim because it was a claim relating to a disabled person.66 
The citation of the CRPD was made without any specific purpose but 
merely because it was a disability case.  
 
Fourthly, in some cases another court’s reference to the CRPD is 
mentioned. Two cases seem to have done this. In Dr Syed Abdul Wahab 
Abdul Aziz v State of Maharashtra,67 the High Court of Bombay made a 
reference to a judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of 
Bombay, which used the CRPD to secure a visually-impaired claimant’s 
right to education under Article 24.68 The Court cross-referenced the case 
of Kritika Purohit v State of Maharashtra 69  where the Petitioner 
successfully challenged the denial of admission to a degree course in 
physiotherapy under Article 24 of the CRPD. The Court in Kritika 
Purohit granted relief both on the basis of PWD Act and Article 24 of the 
CRPD and instructed the government to admit the claimant to the 
physiotherapy degree. The Court in Syed Abdul then relied upon the 
decision in Kritika Purohit to enforce the rights of the Petitioner who was 
denied admission to a graduate course because of his locomotory 
disability of lower limb and 45% visual impairment. In another case of P 
Geetha v Kerala Livestock Development Board Ltd,70 the High Court of 
Kerala makes a reference to the decision of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union in Z v A Government Department71 which dealt with a 
broadly similar matter. The CJEU had denied the claim for paid maternity 
leave to a commissioning mother of a surrogate pregnancy who was 
unable to have a child by natural means as a result of an impairment. She 
claimed that this amounted to disability discrimination in comparison 
with mothers who were able to give birth or who adopted a child. In this 
process, the CJEU had considered the question ‘[whether the CRPD is] 
                                                 
65 Writ Petition (Civil) No 6529/2007 (decided on 4 April 2011) (High Court of Delhi).  
66 Ibid [16].  
67 2013(6) ABR 153 (High Court of Bombay).  
68 Ibid [27].  
69 Writ Petition (Civil) No. 979 of 2010 (decided on 2 August 2010) (High Court of Bombay).  
70 2015(1) KLJ 494 (High Court of Kerela).  
71 Case C-363/12 Z v. A Government department, The Board of management of a community school, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:159. See Waddington in this volume for further commentary on this case. 
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capable of being relied on for the purposes of interpreting, and/or of 
challenging the validity’ of EU law.72 It had found that the CPRD was 
‘capable of being relied on for the purposes of interpreting [EU Law] 
which must, as far as possible, be interpreted in a manner that is 
consistent with [it]’,73 but went on to find that the provisions in the CRPD 
were not ‘unconditional and sufficiently precise…that they therefore do 
not have direct effect in European Union law’.74 The Kerala High Court 
understood this as a position which implied that it was only ‘the domestic 
[EU] law that [governed] the issue’.75 Relying on this, it went on to hold 
that: ‘In the absence of any leave provided for bringing up a child, this 
Court cannot direct the first respondent Board to provide any leave to the 
petitioner for that purpose’. 76  Like the CJEU, it thus denied the 
commissioning mother the right to convalescing or recovery leave 
because she did not physically bear and deliver the child. There is 
apparent hypocrisy in the stance adopted by the High Court of Kerala. In 
one way, it simplifies and ultimately mischaracterizes the CJEU’s 
position that the CRPD had no direct effect because only ‘domestic law’, 
i.e. directives of the European Union were applicable to the case; but in 
another way, it itself relies on the CJEU’s decision even though it is a 
foreign court and not part of the Indian ‘domestic law’. This position of 
the High Court of Kerala may be exceptional given that the examples 
considered in Section 4.2.2. below, which show that the CRPD has also 
been applied directly and substantively by the Indian courts, even before 
it was explicitly given effect by the legislature through the RPD Act 
2016.  
Fifthly, in one case the CRPD was cited to draw force from the fact that 
India is a State party to it. The purpose of highlighting this fact is not 
clear given that the Court makes no further use of the citation; but it can 
be surmized that the CRPD provides a kind of persuasive value or moral 
force to the Court’s legal analysis under the PWD Act and the 
Constitution. In E Murugan v The General Manager (Operation) 
Metropolitan Transport Corporation Ltd, 77  the Madras High Court 
                                                 
72 Ibid [91]. 
73 Ibid [75]. 
74 Ibid [90]. 
75 P Geetha (n 70) [70]. 
76 Ibid [71]. 
77 Writ Petition (Civil) No. 10694 of 2011 (decided 26 April 2011) (High Court of Madras).  
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granted the petition asking for alternative employment, back wages and 
attendant benefits for an employee who was dismissed because he 
acquired a disability during the course of his employment. In giving a 
broad and generous reading to Article 21 of the Constitution on right to 
life and the right to non-discrimination in government employment under 
Section 47 of the PWD Act, the Court seems to add the reference to the 
CRPD in order to bolster its final reasoning: 
 
The rights of the disabled have been spelt out in the Disabilities Act which is 
only an expansion of the rights enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of 
India. Our Country has also signed the [CRPD]. Therefore, a person who had 
suffered disability is entitled to be employed without any loss financially…78 
 
Mere force of ratification seems to provide the Court with a moral basis 
in the absence of a clear legal basis until the Government enacts 
legislation implementing the CRPD domestically. Despite this limitation, 
courts have not only cited the CRPD in the five ways discussed above, 
but have also given it direct legal force in either of the two ways of 
substantively using it in interpreting a claim or using it to bolster or 
confirm the correct legal position which is consistent with India’s 
international commitments. This is evident in the cases considered in the 
next section.  
 
4.2.2. Interpretation  
 
Substantive use of the CRPD and its provisions has also been made by 
the appellate courts to give a broad interpretation to rights of disabled 
persons, even before the CRPD was explicitly given force through the 
RPD Act 2016. The two trends of either using the CRPD directly in 
interpreting the rights or using it to bolster their interpretation can be 
explained with reference to eleven cases. One of the first cases which 
referred to the CRPD, did so substantively. The 2009 decision of the 
Bombay High Court in Ranjit Kumar Rajak v State Bank of India79 sets a 
high benchmark for how the CRPD can be implemented directly, even in 
a dualist State like India which has not yet enacted a domestic legislation 
implementing an international agreement. Taking the cue from Vishaka 
                                                 
78 Ibid [8]. 
79 2009(5) BomCR 227 (High Court of Bombay).  
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and the absence of municipal law or discourse informing the issue of 
reasonable accommodation and the test for assessing ‘undue hardship’, 
the Court used the CRPD and its travaux préparatoires to fill the legal 
gap. The Court was concerned with the question whether ‘a person who is 
fully qualified for a post because of his past or present medical condition 
which otherwise does not interfere with his fitness to dispense the duties 
of his post [can] be denied employment because of the financial burden 
that would be cast on the employer?’.80 The Petitioner in the case had had 
a kidney transplant which did not in any way interfere in discharging his 
employment obligations. He was dismissed merely on the basis of his 
kidney transplant and the monthly cost of medical care accrued by the 
employer. The Court first established the Petitioner’s right to work, 
employment and livelihood quoting in full Article 27 of the CRPD and 
the Constitutional guarantees of equality before law and equality of 
opportunity in Articles 14 and 16(1) respectively.81 It went on to consider 
the meaning of the right in the context of disability by drawing on the 
obligation of ‘reasonable accommodation’ and the limits of claiming 
‘undue hardship’. After perusing the CRPD’s definition of ‘reasonable 
accommodation’ in Article 2, 82  the Court referred to the preparatory 
materials to understand its meaning. 83  It found that the UN Ad Hoc 
Committee on a Comprehensive and Integral International Convention on 
the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with 
Disabilities (‘Ad Hoc Committee’) – responsible for the drafting of the 
Convention – had drawn inspiration from at least two popular models in 
municipal laws of the US and Canada. 84  According to the US 
Rehabilitation Act 1978 the concept of ‘disproportionate burden’ was 
used to cast limits on the employer’s liability in ensuring reasonable 
accommodation and it involved: ‘(1) an insistence on “reasonableness in 
the circumstances”; and (2) an underlying proportionality test that 
balances the rights of and burdens and benefits to, all persons affected by 
the proposed accommodation or adjustment’.85 In the Canadian context, 
the concept of ‘undue hardship’ was assessed in accordance with factors 
like—‘Financial cost disruption of a collective agreement; the morale of 
                                                 
80 Ibid [1]. 
81 Ibid [8] [14]. 
82 Ibid [14]. 





other employees; interchangeability of the workforce and facilities; the 
size of the employer’s operation (because this may relate to the 
employer’s ability to bear the cost and adapt the workplace); safety’.86 
The Court then noted that since the PWD Act did not cover employment 
of disabled persons or refer to the concept of reasonable accommodation, 
it was appropriate to refer to the CRPD’s understanding to fill in the gap 
in municipal law on the subject.87 Thus, taking a cue from Articles 14 and 
15 on equality and non-discrimination, the ruling on direct enforcement 
of international law in Vishaka and the fact that India was a State Party to 
the CRPD, the Court found that the Convention could be made 
enforceable because:  
 
 The law is now well settled that though United Nation Convention may not 
have been enacted into the Municipal Law, as long as the convention is not in 
conflict with the Municipal Law and can be read into Article 21 it is 
enforceable. Therefore, in the absence of any conflict it is possible to read the 
test of reasonable accommodation in employment contracts.88 
 
According to the Court, reading international law to fill in the gap in 
municipal law ‘give[s] added life and dimension to the ever expanding 
concept of life and its true enjoyment’ 89  and that ‘[t]he theory of 
reasonable accommodation even in the absence of municipal law must, 
therefore, flow from our constitutional principle of the right to life and to 
live it with dignity’.90 In its classic approach of reading Article 21 on the 
right to life in an expansive way, the Court found that the right to 
adequate means of livelihood within the State’s economic capacity 91 
meant that: 
 
 A duty is, therefore, cast on the State to provide reasonable accommodation in 
the matter of employment subject to the burden of hardship test being 
satisfied. In the absence of a statutory definition of reasonable 
accommodation, the reasonable accommodation as set out in the [CRPD] in 
the first instance can be considered. It will have to have a nexus with the 
financial burden on the institution and/or undertaking which will have to bear 
                                                 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid [16]. The RPD Act 2016 now recognises the concept of reasonable accommodation in Sections 
2(h) and 2(y), 3(5) and specifically in relation to employment under Section 20(2).  
88 Ibid [17].  
89 Ibid [22]. 
90 Ibid [27]. 
91 Per Olga Tellis (n 12). 
 
 23 
the burden and further the extent to which reasonable accommodation can be 
provided for.92 
 
The Court found that the employer had not placed any evidence to prove 
that the monthly expenditure of Rs 13,000 could qualify as an ‘undue 
burden’ in the context of (by applying the understanding adopted by the 
CRPD) ‘the size of the organisation, the financial implications on the 
organisation and/or on the morale of other employees and the like’.93 It 
thus ordered the Petitioner to be reinstated within sixty days of the 
decision.94  
 
While there was a genuine gap in law on the subject of reasonable 
accommodation and undue hardship in Ranjit Rajak, the CRPD can be 
used directly and substantively where the law on the subject is vague or 
only tangentially relevant. Thus, even when the RPD Act 2016 has now 
recognised the concept of reasonable accommodation; judicial 
interpretation of the CRPD in areas which still remain unclear or outside 
of the purview of the new Act will remain instructive. In the latter case, 
the fact that the CRPD provides a clear conceptual force has made it the 
ultimate legal basis for a court to pronounce upon. For example, in Lalit v 
Government of NCT95 the Petitioners challenged the order of eviction 
from the hostel attached to their state-run institution for the blind. The 
petitioners were all male, between the ages of 25-35 and were said to be 
causing considerable difficulty and disturbance to other blind pupils in 
the hostel especially young students in Classes I-VIII.96 The Respondent 
explained the eviction on the basis of lack of capacity at the institution for 
housing residents other than pupils studying in school.97 Since other older 
residents were also at the institution and not being evicted, the Petitioners 
claimed the right to be treated equally and in a non-discriminatory 
manner without distinction between deserving and undeserving blind 
residents.98  The Court was thus tasked with balancing the competing 
interests of younger pupils and older residents at the institution. The 
                                                 
92 Ranjit Rajak (n 79) [21]. 
93 Ibid [29]. 
94 Ibid [30]. 
95 Writ Petition (Civil) No. 8568 of 2009 (decided on 2 December 2010) (High Court of Delhi).  
96 Ibid [3]-[4].  
97 Ibid [12].  
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Court found guidance in the clearest and most persuasive statement on 
the right to education under the CRPD: 
 
 the context of the inviolable human rights of the disabled, it is necessary to 
take note of the binding and mandatory provisions of [PWD Act] (specifically 
Sections 26 and 30) and the [CRPD] which has been ratified by India. In 
particular, Article 7 which set out the obligations of the States towards 
children with disabilities, Article 9 which obliges the States to take appropriate 
measures to ensure access to “schools, housing, medical facilities”, and Article 
24 which deals with the right to education are relevant. In the context of the 
present case, reference may be made to Article 24(2) CRPD…99 
 
The Court went on to quote from and draw upon Article 24 to prioritize 
the right to education of disabled children over the right of older residents 
to be housed at the institution. It is this legal basis which formed the core 
of the Court’s reasoning: 
 
Viewed in the above background, primary purpose of having a hostel attached 
to the [institution] was to ensure that visually challenged young students, up to 
Class VIII, are provided shelter during their stint at the school. [Thus] [t]he 
policy of restricting the hostel facility to children who have not yet completed 
Class VIII is a reasonable one considering the limited scope of availability of 
the fundamental right to education to the age group of six to fourteen…If this 
primary object is not kept in view, then it may result in an unfair denial of the 
right to education of other deserving young students who are visually 
challenged. 
 
The Court thus ordered the removal of the older residents on the basis of 
enforcing the right to education for disabled children (which was most 
clearly spelt out in the CRPD) and the conditions necessary for realizing 
that (drawn from Article 24(2)), i.e. residence at the institution of their 
learning. The RPD Act 2016 now recognises the duties of the State in 
relation to education of disabled persons under Sections 16-18; but the 
interpretation in Lalit which is specifically rights-based and CRPD-
consistent, may continue to strengthen the way in which the State’s duty 
is actually enforced today. This trend is reinforced by the Supreme Court 
which drew upon Article 24 in a similar way in Sambhavana v University 
of Delhi.100 The Petitioner in Sambhavana sought a direction that the 
Respondent (the University of Delhi) should introduce blind-friendly 
foundation courses in its curriculum, provide accessible reading materials 
                                                 
99 Ibid [14]. 
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and learning tools for effective education, and provide for representation 
of disabled persons in university administration. After reminding itself of 
the statutory basis of the right to education in Sections 30 and 32 of the 
PWD Act, the Court went on to develop fully and contextualize the right 
in light of Article 24(4) of the CRPD. It was seen as mandating the States 
Parties to realize the right to education by taking ‘appropriate measures to 
employ teachers, including teachers with disabilities, who are qualified in 
sign language and/or Braille, and to train professionals and staff who 
work at all levels of education…incorporate[ing] disability awareness and 
the use of appropriate augmentative and alternative modes, means and 
formats of communication, educational techniques and materials to 
support persons with disabilities’.101 The Court granted the claim relying 
on this extensive breadth and scope of Article 24 of the CRPD. Since the 
CRPD provided a deeper level of detail relevant to the matter, the 
Supreme Court was inclined to interpret the statutory rights in light of the 
strides made in the CRPD. It thus remarked that: ‘[w]e are absolutely 
conscious that there is an enactment [PWD Act] but India has shown its 
concern by ratifying the said Convention and, therefore, we have 
reproduced the same’.102 What becomes clear in the Court’s final order 
which asks the Appellant-organization to attend immediately to the 
grievances of blind pupils is that, this ‘reproduction’ of the CRPD 
obligations underlined the Court’s interpretation of the existing 
constitutional and statutory obligations.103  
 
In the same way, the High Court of Rajasthan in Desh Deepak Dhamija v 
Union Bank of India104 specifically relied upon Article 27 on the right to 
work under the CPRD to find that the denial of a job to an otherwise 
qualified person on the basis of his medical condition was unlawful under 
Article 21 of the Constitution. The enforcement of the CRPD via Article 
21 seems to have been done in a non-tedious and terse way, especially so, 
when there was no other law clarifying the position of those with chronic 
diseases. The Court’s consolidated reasoning for the order appears thus:  
 
                                                 
101 Ibid [11]. 
102 Ibid [12]. 
103 The Supreme Court also relied upon Article 41 of the Constitution of India which casts a duty on the 
State to make effective provisions for securing, inter alia, the rights of disabled persons and those 
suffering from other infirmities within the limits of economic capacity and development. Ibid.  
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 The physical disability as mentioned in the [PWD Act] although does not 
include the chronic disease, cannot be treated as prohibited or unlawful. It 
cannot be read to say that a person suffering from chronic disease like the 
renal failure cannot be granted job. In the absence of any law, the action of 
State must be guided by the Directive Principles which governs the legislative 
function of the State. It is incumbent upon the State to safeguard the 
constitutional mandate and must ensure fairness and equality along with right 
to work and livelihood granted under Article 21 of the Constitution subject to 
the test laid down in Article 21 of the Constitution.105 
 
The High Court of Rajasthan in Desk Deepak does not offer as much 
justification as was offered by the High Court of Bombay in Ranjit Rajak 
for directly enforcing the CRPD via Article 21. The former found the gap 
in law to be automatically filled in favour of the Petitioner via the 
Constitution and binding international commitments. The trend can be 
traced back to Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v Shrirang 
Anandrao Jadhav,106 where the Court relied on the CRPD to interpret 
Section 47 of the PWD Act on non-discrimination in government 
employment. The case involved dismissal of a driver who had acquired a 
disability during the course of his employment. In reinstating the terms 
and benefits of the employment, the Court held that employers could not 
deny the protection of Section 47 when the disability of the employee 
was less than 40%. Justice Chandrachud kept the line of reasoning short 
but pointed. He relied on the mandate of Preamble, Articles 1, 4 and 27 of 
the CRPD and the fact that non-discrimination, especially in public 
employment did not seem to be limited on the basis of level of disability, 
especially when it was acquired during the course of the employment.107 
Shrirang was followed in M Venkateswarlu v Andhra Pradesh State Road 
Transport Corporation,108 which involved similar facts. The High Court 
of Telangana and Andhra Pradesh once again quoted the Preamble and 
Articles 2, 4 and 27 and held that:  
 
It is thus beyond pale of doubt that the provisions of Section 47 of the [PWD] 
Act are attracted if a serving employee acquires disability, irrespective of 
degree of disability and even if such disability is not covered by definition 
clauses in [the PWD Act]. The respondent corporations are bound by the said 
mandate and the United Nations Convention.109 
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This seems to have been a popular trend—to enforce rights under the 
CRPD directly without lengthy justifications, arguably justified by the 
delayed implementation of the CRPD, completed only in December 2016 
through the adoption of the RPD Act. For example in Vibhu Dayal 
Sharma v Director,110 the High Court of Punjab and Haryana was called 
upon to extend the right to be employed under a disability reservation (a 
3% employment quota) under the PWD Act to the Petitioner who had a 
chronic disease. The Court found it appropriate to dispose the matter by 
urging the Parliament to consider this issue instead. It did so, by agreeing 
with the Petitioner that such reconsideration had become necessary in 
light of developments in international law and law in other 
jurisdictions.111 The Petitioner had argued that India has not kept pace 
with the development of disability law under the CRPD and other 
countries like the UK where the definition of what constitutes a disability 
had considerably expanded to include certain chronic illnesses. In a rare 
instance, the Court noted the developments in India in relation to bringing 
the municipal law in line with the CRPD: 
 
 In the light of presentation of a Bill by a Committee appointed by the Ministry 
of Social Justice and Empowerment, Government of India on 30.06.2011 on a 
research prepared by the Centre for Disability Studies, NALSAR University of 
Law, Hyderabad, India in its effort to enact a new law in harmony with the 
[CRPD]. The [CRPD] is for full realization of all human rights and 
 fundamental freedoms for all Persons with Disabilities without discrimination 
of any kind on the basis of disability. India is under an international 
commitment and is obligated to enact suitable legislation in furtherance of the 
rights recognized in the UN Convention. The [PWD Act] has been on the 
Statute Book in India for 18 years but the Act does not incorporate the number 
of rights recognized in the [CRPD] or the recognized rights are not in total 
harmony with the principles of the Convention. It has been suggested that the 
Constitution of India needs to be amended in order to remove discrimination 
on grounds of disability so as to include the term disability in 
Articles 15 & 16 of the Constitution as one of the prohibited grounds.112  
 
The Court acknowledged the (then) impending Draft Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities Bill 2012 and noted that it did not include chronic 
illnesses in the definition of disability. In the circumstances where a new 
piece of legislation on disability was in the pipeline but did not cover 
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chronic illnesses, Raina J, found it most appropriate to propose the 
following order to the government: 
 
 I deem it fit in the future interest of stake holders that the respondents and 
particularly the Union of India to consider whether Cancer, illnesses and 
diseases which may medically qualify as disabilities in its generic sense which 
adversely effect such persons day-to-day basis, can fall as disability sufficient 
to merit reservation in educational seats etc. In view of the complexities 
 involved, it would not be appropriate for this Court to fix any time line and 
would only hope that the matter is examined holistically for the attention it 
deserves before the new law is enacted replacing the [PWD Act] to keep pace 
with International Conventions, United Nations declarations and charters on 
the subject to consider if can be brought into domestic law and make it 
dynamic and ahead of times.113 
 
Given that no new law was enacted in the two years following Raina J’s 
decision, it is understandable why the High Court of Rajasthan did not 
defer to legislative will in Desh Deepak. The slow pace of development 
of disability law, especially in bringing it in line with the CRPD, seems to 
have provided an inarticulate but justifiable ground for courts (per 
Vishaka) to address the gap in law. Thus, Ranjit Rajak, Shrirang, Lalit, 
Sambhavana and Desh Deepak are, by no means, outliers in the way 
courts make use of the CRPD directly and substantively. But there may 
be circumstances where there is no real gap in the law on a subject. While 
not operating as the legal ground for relief in such a case, the CRPD can 
still add persuasive force to a transformative interpretation of disability 
rights under municipal law. In this way, reliance on the CRPD may 
provide a broad basis for the interpretation of the new RPD Act, even 
where its own terms may appear limited. This approach can be 
extrapolated from the way in which the Supreme Court invoked the 
CRPD in the seminal case of Suchita Srivastava v Chandigarh 
Administration.114 The case involved an appeal to quash the decision of 
the Punjab and Haryana High Court ordering an abortion for a pregnant 
rape victim who had an intellectual disability (‘mental retardation’). The 
Supreme Court quashed the termination of pregnancy on grounds that: (i) 
the High Court could not have ordered the abortion without the consent 
of the woman in question because the legal basis under the Medical 
Termination of Pregnancy Act 1971 limited the revocation of consent 
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only in relation to minors and persons with ‘mental illness’ (which is 
distinct from ‘mental retardation’ under the said statue); and (ii) failing 
that statutory basis, the High Court could still not have exercised ‘parens 
patriae’ jurisdiction in the ‘best interests’ of the woman who clearly 
wanted to bear the child.115 The Supreme Court rounded off the legal 
basis of its decision by stating that: ‘[o]ur conclusions in this case are 
strengthened by some norms developed in the realm of international 
law’. 116  In addition to citing extensively from the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons 1971, the Court 
recalled that: ‘India has ratified the [CRPD] on October 1, 2007 and the 
contents of the same are binding on our legal system’.117 Whilst the Court 
made no further reference to the CRPD, two things are pertinent to note. 
First, despite the fact that the Supreme Court did not refer to the CRPD’s 
understanding of legal capacity, its strong view that the opinions of 
disabled persons cannot be simply obliterated on the thin basis of 
promoting their ‘best interests’ charts a different course than the 
traditional view of disabled persons as in need of protection by the state. 
The significance of introducing this thinking in Indian jurisprudence 
cannot be overstated. Even though the Court does not directly refer to the 
CRPD’s language or provisions, the fact that its interpretation is CRPD-
consistent breaks away from the existing welfare-model of disability laws 
in India, and makes the general reference to the CRPD a significant 
one. 118  Secondly, Suchita Srivastava’s framing of the way in which 
international law is made applicable is different from cases like Ranjit 
Rajak which made use of the CRPD as the legal basis of the claim upon 
which the Court pronounced the decision. In Suchita Srivastava, the 
Supreme Court cites the CRPD to bolster the conclusion it reaches, 
especially, one which favours an expansive interpretation of rights; this is 
distinct from the mere citation referred to in the previous section, in that 
it cites the position in international law as both binding and having been 
given effect to through the broad interpretation given to rights of the 
disabled woman in the case. In light of the previous point, the CRPD-
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compliant interpretation in Suchita Srivastsava elevates the reference to 
one which inspires and supports the Court’s reasoning.  
 
This trend has continued since and can likely to assist the interpretation 
and implementation of the new RPD Act 2016 in a significant way. The 
landmark decision Jeeja Ghosh v Union of India 119  decided by the 
Supreme Court in May 2016 maps the pattern of interpretation charted in 
Suchita Srivastsava. The case involved a complaint by a leading 
disability rights campaigner, Jeeja Ghosh, for being de-boarded from a 
flight on the instructions of the pilot. The decision to de-board was made 
without consultation and based solely on the basis of the Petitioner’s 
disability (cerebral palsy). She claimed this to be in violation of Civil 
Aviation Requirements of 2008 which had recognized the principles of 
non-discrimination and access for persons with disabilities in the context 
of air travel. The Supreme Court, in finding for the Petitioner, specifically 
cited Articles 5 and 9 of the CRPD.120 It went on to find these provisions 
directly applicable on the basis that: 
 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1963 requires India’s internal 
legislation to comply with international commitments. Article 27 states that a 
“State party... may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification 
for its failure to perform a treaty.”121 
 
Based on this the Supreme Court provided an elaborate account of the 
change of discourse on disability rights from a welfare to human rights 
model since the CRPD. 122  It emphasized that it was this shift from 
sympathy to equality which, though formally recognized, has not been 
actually realized in India. Jeeja Ghosh’s treatment was one marked by 
continued ignorance about disabilities like cerebral palsy. It thus found 
the lack of sensitivity of the airline pilot and crew not only illegal but 
decrying the constitutional and CRPD obligations based on human 
dignity.123 In one of its strongest and clearest statements on the CRPD, 
the judges proclaimed: 
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All the rights conferred upon [persons with disabilities] send an eloquent 
message that there is no question of sympathising with such persons and 
extending them medical or other help. They are also human beings and they 
have to grow as normal persons and are to be extended all facilities in this 
behalf. The subject of the rights of persons with disabilities should be 
approached from human rights perspective, which recognised that persons 
with disabilities were entitled to enjoy the full range of internationally 
guaranteed rights and freedoms without discrimination on the ground of 
disability.124 
 
High Courts too have maintained a progressive record of applying the 
CRPD. In R Parthiban v State of Tamil Nadu,125  the High Court of 
Madras drew upon international commitments to bolster the conclusion it 
reached in favour of a reservation in employment (a quota) for disabled 
persons by referring to the international commitment made by India and 
thus making it a ground of relief alongside the statutory and constitutional 
basis. The Petitioner in Parthiban was a physics postgraduate belonging 
to a backward community and having post-polio residual paralysis in the 
left lower limbs. He was denied appointment as a physics lecturer both 
under the employment quota reserved for disabled persons as well as the 
quota for candidates belonging to recognized backward communities. He 
claimed that the denial was in violation of the CPRD, in addition to his 
Constitutional rights, the PWD Act, and the Central and State guidelines 
applicable in the matter.126 The Court found that the Respondent was duty 
bound to reserve not less than 3% of positions in every establishment for 
disabled persons as per the provisions of the PWD Act.127 It further found 
that its view of mandatory ‘horizontal’ (quota) reservations based on 
disability which cut across ‘vertical’ caste-based reservations was one in 
line with India’s international commitments: 
 
 Disability has drawn the attention of the world wide community. India is a 
signatory to various international treaties and conventions. The State, 
therefore, took a policy decision to have horizontal reservation with a view to 
fulfil its constitutional object as also its commitment to the international 
community.128 
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According to the Court, the international commitment had legal force 
because India had signed and ratified the CRPD.129 It further explained 
that the legal force brought about a shift in the discourse on disability 
rights in India: 
 
 CRPD is the first comprehensive human rights treaty of the 21st century and 
though it does not create any new right for persons with disabilities, it seeks to 
contextualize existing rights for the specific circumstances of persons with 
disabilities. Apart from universal fundamental rights like equality, non-
discrimination, life, liberty, the Convention covers a number of key areas of 
life that are critical to persons with disabilities such as accessibility, personal 
mobility, health, education, employment, habitation and rehabilitation, 
participation in political life. The Convention marks a shift in viewing 
disability from a social welfare concern to a human rights issue, which 
involves acknowledging that societal barriers and prejudices are themselves 
disabling.130 
 
Citing Article 24 on the right to education as the ‘core’ of the CRPD, the 
Court identified four ‘salient features’ of the CRPD as:  
 
 (1) the shift in the paradigm of disability rights from one of welfare to one of 
human rights agenda; (2) the mainstreaming of intellectual and mental 
disabilities within the disability scheme and with other citizens; (3) it is an 
undivided package of rights - i.e. health rights are not delinked from 
economic, civil and other rights; (4) All disabled persons have the capability 
to exercise their rights because the CRPD grants them equality of legal 
capacity irrespective of their mental capacity.131 
 
This shift in discourse on disability rights brought about by the CRPD 
compelled the Court to proclaim that: ‘on this ground also, the Petitioner 
herein is entitled for the relief sought for’.132 Thus, the change in the way 
disability rights operate after the CRPD became inspirational and legally 
binding for the Court to enforce. Again, like Suchita Srivastava and Jeeja 
Ghosh, whilst the Court in Parthiban also did not rely on any specific 
provision (other than quoting Article 24), the general tenor (‘object and 
purpose’) of the CRPD was itself considered sufficient in providing legal 
guidance to the Court.  
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This approach is also visible in National Association of the Deaf v Union 
of India. 133  In light of the vast statistic of over 63 million hearing 
impaired people and 10 to 25 million using sign language,134 the petition 
in this case sought to address the overall availability and quality of sign 
language to assist deaf people in accessing public life in India. In 
particular, the Petitioners prayed for the training and appointment of an 
adequate number of sign language interpreters and trained personnel, 
such as disability commissioners, at all points of interface of disabled 
persons with government services like airport, banks etc. The Court 
allowed the petition and ordered a host of directions for the Government 
to enforce in relation to the assessment for need, training and 
appointment of sign language interpreters. In a rather brief judgment 
which does not rely on any other statutory or constitutional basis other 
than Article 21 of the Constitution, the Court’s only conceptual and legal 
reference for a broad interpretation of disabled rights seems to stem from 
this statement: 
 
 The [CRPD] adopted by the General Assembly and ratified by the Govt. of 
India on 1st October, 2007 also provides for taking appropriate measures to 
provide forms of live assistance and intermediaries including guides, readers 
and professional Sign Language Interpreters to facilitate accessibility to 
buildings and other facilities open to the public. Needless to state that all the 
said rights are composite part of life enshrined in Article 21 of the 
Constitution of India.135 
 
The High Court of Delhi thus fed into the longstanding tradition of 
reading Article 21 in the most expansive way; but what is interesting to 
note is that the acceptable limits of expansiveness of the constitutional 
right under Article 21 in relation to disabled persons, were informed by 
the general tenor or ‘object and purpose’ of the CRPD, which had not 
been fully implemented then by India.136  
 
Besides using the CRPD to fortify the constitutional right to life under 
Article 21, courts may draw upon the CRPD as the legal basis when 
giving a broad reading to statutory rights, especially under the PWD Act. 
For example in V Palani v Management of Metropolitan Transport 
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Corporation (Chennai) Ltd137 the Madras High Court enforced Section 47 
of the PWD Act to grant pay protection with continuity of service, back 
wages and other attendant benefits from the date of dismissal of the 
Petitioner by referring to and relying upon a slew of CRPD provisions 
including Articles 4(d), 15(2), 17, 2(i), 2(j), 2(k), 2(m), 2(o), 2(p), 2(t), 
2(w). In a very brief order, the Court does not overtly articulate its 
approach for enforcing the CRPD, but it is clear that the bulk of the 
CRPD references feed into the court’s favourable stance towards broadly 
interpreting an otherwise sparse Section 47 of PWD Act on non-
discrimination in government employment. There is reason to hope that 
such CRPD-inspired reasoning will continue to define interpretation of 
Chapter IV of the new RPD Act 2016 concerning skill development and 
employment obligations of the State. 
 
5. Implications of Judicial Engagement with the CRPD 
 
The analysis in Section 4 reveals three distinct implications of the 
evolution of disability case law since India ratified the CRPD—first, the 
ways in which the CRPD has been interpreted; secondly, the 
constitutional and statutory implications of interpreting the CRPD within 
the framework of fundamental rights and prevailing disability law; and 
lastly, the implications of India’s evolving dualist position in 
international law on disability law. Pulling these three strands together 
helps understand the direction of development of judicial thought on 
disability rights.   
 
5.1. Interpretation of the CPRD 
 
Within the range of progressive cases, at least three areas emerge as 
involving an interpretation of the CRPD in a substantive way—
reasonable accommodation, education and employment. 138  It is useful 
then to summarize the precise ways in which the courts interpreted 
Articles 2, 24 and 27 of the CRPD. 
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5.1.1. Article 2 
 
As elaborated in Section 4.2.2., Ranjit Rajak and Desk Deepak dealt with 
similar fact situations of denial of reasonable accommodation in 
employment to persons with kidney-related medical conditions. Whilst 
Ranjit Rajak elaborately drew on Article 2’s definition of reasonable 
accommodation, especially by referring to the travaux préparatoires of 
the CRPD, Desk Deepak simply relied on Ranjit Rajak’s groundwork to 
extend the right to work with a right to be reasonably accommodated to 
the Petitioner. Both acknowledged that the concept of reasonable 
accommodation had not been developed in the context of disability law in 
India. Given the Vishaka mandate to fill in the gaps in law where no 
(conflicting) law exists, Article 2 was read into the relevant constitutional 
and statutory law on the subject. In Ranjit Rajak, the Court adopted the 
duty to reasonably accommodate as part of the right to work and 
livelihood under Article 21 of the Constitution.139 It subjected this duty to 
the ‘undue burden’ standard found in Article 2 of the CRPD. According 
to the Court (on the basis of its reading of the travaux préparatoires of the 
CRPD), the standard adopted in the CRPD was one which had ‘a nexus 
with the financial burden on the institution and/or undertaking which will 
have to bear the burden and further the extent to which reasonable 
accommodation can be provided for’.140 This reading according to the 
Court ‘added life and dimension to the ever expanding concept of life and 
its true enjoyment [under Article 21 of the Constitution’. 141  What is 
striking is that the Court does not delve into the definition of reasonable 
accommodation itself but accepts the Petitioner’s argument that the 
demand for reasonable accommodation succeeds when it satisfies the 
undue burden test. So when a Petitioner claims reasonable 
accommodation in a specific situation, the burden is cast upon the 
‘employer to place material before this Court to show the undue hardship 
that will be occasioned...[and] [i]n the absence of establishing undue 
hardship a direction can be issued to accommodate such a person’.142 The 
adoption of the CRPD interpretation of Article 2 seems to have directly 
inspired this disability-friendly rights approach which was otherwise 
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missing in domestic law until now. The RPD Act 2016 in Article 2(y) 
defines the concept of reasonable accommodation as ‘necessary and 
appropriate modification and adjustments, without imposing a 
disproportionate or undue burden in a particular case, to ensure to persons 
with disabilities the enjoyment or exercise of rights equally with others.’ 
Given that undue burden still remains an elusive concept, cases like 
Ranjit Rajak and Desk Deepak provide instructive lessons and 
groundwork in implementing the RPD Act 2016.  
 
5.1.2. Article 24 
 
In relation to the right to education, the specificity of the meaning of the 
right for persons with disabilities under Article 24 of the CRPD provides 
greater and contextual depth to a right which is otherwise widely 
recognized under the Constitution (Article 21-A), legislation (Sections 30 
and 32 of the PWD Act and the RTE Act) and in case law. 143  A 
substantial number of six cases (Pramod Arora, Social Jurist, Dr Syed, 
Lalit, Sambhavna and Parthiban) showed how the CPRD formulation has 
given conceptual direction for realizing the right to education because of 
the clear articulation of the package of rights which are to be available for 
disabled persons. As discussed in the previous section, whilst most courts 
simply relied on the text of Article 24 to give a broad interpretation to 
education-related claims, Lalit stands out in its substantive reliance and 
engagement with Article 24. In comparison with the duty-based 
legislative provisions on education incorporated in the RPD Act 2016, 
Lalit’s rights-based analysis appears transformative and thus may 
continue to steer the realisation of the general constitutional right under 
Article 21-A specifically for disabled persons.  
 
Lalit exemplifies a classic conflict of rights situation where the disabled 
Petitioners seek to enforce their right to housing in the institution they 
live in against the right to education and housing of younger disabled 
residents at the institution.144 In balancing the competing interests, given 
the paucity of resources, the Court seems to have given more weight to 
the housing claim of those residents who were receiving education at the 
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institution than those who already had completed theirs. In framing the 
issue as one of education and not housing rights per se, the Court found 
that younger residents in state run-institutions had a right to shelter and 
decent living as ‘an inalienable facet of right to education itself’.145 Given 
that this facet of the right to education was not otherwise developed in 
domestic disability jurisprudence, the CRPD became the mainstay for 
according priority to the rights of younger disabled residents. This 
decision was further guided by Article 7 which set out the obligations of 
States towards children with disabilities and Article 9 which obliged the 
States to take appropriate measures to ensure access to ‘schools, housing, 
medical facilities’ and Article 24 on right to education. 146  It was in 
reference to these provisions that the Court resolved the intersecting 
context of disability, children, housing and educational needs by holding 
that: ‘in the context of a disabled child housed in a state-run institution 
there are a cluster of laws and a bouquet of rights, all of which can be 
traced to the fundamental rights to liberty and life with dignity’.147 Thus, 
in the final analysis, the Court sought to address the ‘cascading effect of 
multiple disadvantages’ of a resident ‘as a person, as a young person, a 
disabled young person, a disabled young person’ who is ‘doubly 
disadvantaged’ by addressing the deprivation of housing as a barrier to 
access education.148 In this way, the CRPD’s enunciation of the right to 
education along with the rights of children and the right to access to 
housing in the context of disability, provided a methodical conspectus to 
the court for addressing the competing interests in a meaningful way.  
 
5.1.3. Article 27 
 
The seven cases concerning employment (Shrirang, M Venkateswarlu, 
Murugan, Ranjit Rajak, Parthiban, Akbari Kaushik, Desh Deepak) rely, 
either directly or indirectly, on Article 27 of the CRPD for adding 
conceptual force to Chapter VI (‘employment’) and Section 47 (‘non-
discrimination in government employment’) of the PWD Act by 
recognizing and applying concepts like reasonable accommodation at the 
workplace, accessibility to general technical and vocational programmes, 
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equality and non-discrimination in conditions of recruitment and 
continuance of employment. These concepts were either absent or 
sparsely developed in municipal law until RPD Act 2016. Five cases — 
Shrirang, M Venkateswarlu, Murugan, Ranjit Rajak and Desk Deepak 
apply Article 27 substantively; while the Petitioner in Akbari Kaushik 
cited Article 27 in obtaining relief under the PWD Act in light of these 
concepts.  
 
In Ranjit Rajak, the Court quoted in full Article 27 of the CRPD on work 
and employment.149 As discussed above, the case heavily drew upon the 
CRPD understanding of reasonable accommodation adopted in Article 2 
given the lack of informative disability jurisprudence on reasonable 
accommodation in India. The case, involving denial of employment to the 
Petitioner based on the history of a kidney transplant, was argued on the 
basis of equality and public employment under Articles 14 and 16(1) of 
the Constitution which was claimed to be a denial of ‘an opportunity to 
earn a livelihood’ considered to be a part of right to life.150 The Court 
noted that employment for ‘persons with medical disabilities’ was not 
covered under the prevailing disability law, the PWD Act.151 Given this 
fact, and applying the settled law per Vishaka, the Court found that the 
right to livelihood of disabled persons was also part of Article 21 since 
India had ratified the CRPD: 
 
In the absence of Municipal law, the [CRPD] can be read into Article 21 as it 
does not in any way conflict with our Municipal law as the State shall secure 
that men and women have the right to adequate means of livelihood within its 
economic capacity.152 
 
This manoeuvre enabled the Court to delve into the standard of 
reasonable accommodation to be provided in employment. Reading in 
Article 27 of the CRPD as part of the constitutional right to life under 
Article 21 thus became the key to enforcing the requirement of 
reasonable accommodation not simply as a matter of right to equality 
(Article 14) or right to public employment (Article 16) or right to life 
(Article 21) but more specifically within the framework of the right to 
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work of disabled persons as enshrined in the CRPD. The case of Desh 
Deepak further confirms that this inclination to enforce the right to work 
of disabled persons as a matter of Article 27 per se. In Desh Deepak the 
Court specifically relied on Article 27 to hold that an otherwise 
competent person cannot be denied a job simply based on her medical 
condition. The Court quotes Article 27(1) in full153  and relies on the 
‘almost identical’ 154  case of Ranjit Rajak 155  to find that even though 
having a kidney transplant was not a disability listed in the PWD Act, it 
could not be used to justify employment discrimination.156 In this way, 
both Desh Deepak and Ranjit Rajak extend the CRPD’s right to work to 
‘persons with medical disabilities’ that are not domestically covered 
under the list of disabilities in the PWD Act. Both cases were centrally 
focussed on addressing the nature of deprivation (denial of employment) 
which resulted from a discriminatory treatment on the basis of a medical 
condition, rather than being mired in whether a medical condition should 
be considered a disability or not. Shrirang and M Venkateswarlu did the 
same in declining to limit the right to non-discrimination in employment 
to disabilities which were less than a certain mathematical percentage 
under the PWD Act. The courts have thus aligned with the social model 
of disability rather than the medical model, in being concerned with how 
a medical condition interacts with barriers (job requirements) to produce 
disadvantage (denial of employment). The fact that the denial was one 
that fell within the precincts of Article 27 aided this line of reasoning. 
This could be highly relevant in the application of the RPD Act 2016 
especially extending the benefit of the Act to chronic illnesses not 
enumerated in the Schedule enlisting the protected disabilities. 
 
As noted in Section 4.2.2., Parthiban’s references to the shift in discourse 
brought about by the CRPD also guided the enforcement of the disability 
related employment reservation (quota). Without citing Article 27, the 
Court’s overall philosophy inspired by the CRPD helped the Petitioner in 
challenging successfully his denial of employment as a physics lecturer. 
Thus, the general tenor of the CRPD may also become a guiding force for 
reinforcing particular rights like work and employment. In fact, the mere 
                                                 
153 Ibid [15]. 
154 Ibid [18]. 
155 Ibid [17]. 
156 Ibid [22]. 
 
 40 
force of ratification of the CRPD provided the Court in Murugan with a 
reason to hold that the right to employment for disabled persons was a 
part of Article 21. Though these cases do not show an interpretive 
engagement with Article 27, it is clear that in the final analysis, it is the 
right under Article 27 which was enforced in principle. Given that no 
equivalent right to work for disabled persons exists other than in a limited 
way under the PWD Act and now the RPD Act, the right to public 
employment in Article 16, and the right to livelihood under Article 21, 
the reliance on the CRPD in these cases, especially Article 27, created a 
space for a self-standing expansive right to work for disabled persons in 
India.  
 
5.2. Constitutional and international law implications    
 
The analysis of the twenty-four cases reveals not a single but a host of 
approaches the courts have applied in engaging with the CRPD. Thus, the 
thematic organization of cases on the basis of ‘citation’ and 
‘interpretation’ merely opened up further ways of delineating the judicial 
approaches. Sections 4.2.1. and 4.2.2. discursively examined the diversity 
of ways in which the CRPD is invoked and utilized. Besides the specific 
interpretive reflections of the CRPD offered in the previous sections, 
some overall observations remain due in understanding the effect of these 
approaches within international law, Indian constitutional law, rights 
jurisprudence, and disability discourse. This section offers some tentative 
thoughts on consolidating these lessons from the Indian cases.  
 
It is useful to open with some preliminary remarks about the volume and 
quality of results returned in the search. It would be accurate to say that 
the use of the CRPD has not been massive, though it has been referred to 
in a modest number of cases. Given that India is a dualist country and has 
only recently enacted the legislation implementing the CRPD obligations 
as mandated by Article 253 of the Constitution, the reference to the 
CRPD in these cases—whether as citing or interpreting it, is no small 
feat.157 The legislative delay made the courts ‘generally sympathetic’ to 
                                                 
157 See for the trend of positive judgments on disability rights even before the CRPD was ratified: 
Shruti Pandey, Priyanka Chirimar and Deepak D’Souza (eds), Disability and the Law (Human Rights 
Law Network 2005) and National Human Rights Commission, Disability Manual (2005) 
<http://nhrc.nic.in/documents/Publications/NHRC-Book-Disability.pdf> accessed 10 January 2016. 
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disability rights but not extremely so. 158  Given that gap between 
ratification and implementation, the reference to the CRPD seems natural 
when seen in light of Article 51(c) of the Constitution. Thus, the long 
wait for the full implementation of the CRPD and its measured invocation 
by the courts are two counter-balancing considerations in gauging the 
overall impact of the judicial use of the CRPD.  
 
The ready citation or interpretation of the CRPD between the period of 
2007 (when India ratified the CRPD) and 2016 (when India passed the 
RPD Act implementing the CRPD) can be seen as the fulfilment of a 
‘negative duty’ which arises when a State becomes a signatory or submits 
instruments for ratification without fully ratifying, i.e. implementing the 
obligations through domestic legislation.159 As Dhanda explains: 
 
When a State party signs an international convention it undertakes that it shall 
not carry out any activity which is opposed to the mandate of the convention. 
Thus whilst ratification brings in a positive obligation signature inducts a 
negative duty. It would be unwise to accord no significance to this negative 
duty. At the very least this duty places an embargo on any other laws and 
policies which diminish the rights of persons with disabilities.160 
 
This duty can be traced to Article 18(a) of the VCLT where a State is 
obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of 
a treaty when it has signed or ratified, but still not implemented a treaty in 
its domestic law.161 Without undertaking the exercise of pinning down the 
exact ‘object and purpose’ of the CRPD, it is safe to say that some of the 
CRPD’s core concepts like the social model of disability, legal capacity, 
                                                 
158 Tushti Chopra, ‘Expanding the Horizons of Disability Law in India: A Study from a Human Rights 
Perspective’ 41 (2013) Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 813-814.  
159 It is useful to note that although India had ‘ratified’ the CRPD having deposited the instrument of 
ratification in 2007, this did not automatically mean ratification in the sense that the CRPD became 
part of the domestic law – a feat only accomplished after the RPD Act was passed by the Parliament in 
December 2016. As Dhanda explains: ‘This gap between signature and ratification [subsists] because 
countries differ in the approach towards ratification and in the procedure by which countries induct 
norms of international law into municipal law. A number of countries [like India] do not ratify a 
convention till they have modified all domestic laws and policies and brought them into conformity 
with the international convention. For these countries the deposit of the instrument of ratification is no 
more than a formality as they would have fulfilled all their commitments emanating from the 
international instruments. Other countries take stock of the domestic situation and if they believe there 
is nothing in the international instrument with which they have disagreement they go ahead and ratify 
the instrument’. Dhanda, ‘Constructing a New Human Rights Lexicon’ (n 1).  
160 Ibid. 
161  See Paolo Palchetti, ‘Article 18 of the 1969 Vienna Convention: A Vague and Ineffective 
Obligation or a Useful Means for Strengthening Legal Cooperation?’ in Enzo Cannizzaro, The Law of 
Treaties Beyond the Vienna Convention (Oxford University Press 2001).  
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equality and non-discrimination, reasonable accommodation and 
accessibility, should not be plainly defeated by the courts. 162  The 
Supreme Court has also relied on Article 27 of the VCLT in Jeeja Ghosh 
to assert that India’s internal legislations must comply with its 
international obligations.163 Read along with Article 51(c) of the Indian 
Constitution which obliges the State to foster respect for treaty 
obligations, the VCLT justifies the use of the CRPD as an interpretive 
tool by courts to advance disability rights in consonance with India’s 
international obligations. Thus, for example, the use of the CRPD in 
seminal cases like Suchita Srivastava, Parthiban and Jeeja Ghosh did not 
involve reliance on specific provisions under the CRPD, but the Courts’ 
reference to the ‘core’ or ‘salient features’ of the CRPD demonstrates an 
appreciation of the paradigm shift brought about by the CRPD. It is this 
progressive dimension of the CPRD which is reflected in: Suchita 
Srivastava and Jeeja Ghosh’s understanding of legal capacity which is a 
breakaway from the paternalistic and welfare model of disabled rights in 
India; as well as Parthiban’s enforcement of disability-based quotas in 
employment as separate from caste-based quotas. Given that the 
legislative intent to enact a robust law has been dwindling, the judicial 
inclination to rely on the overall philosophy and context of the CRPD 
should not just be applauded for being progressive but also legally sound 
in appreciating the force of Article 51(c) of the Constitution and 
obligations under the VCLT.  
 
It is interesting to note that the courts did not either highlight the absence 
of a law implementing the CRPD or put pressure on the legislature for 
enacting such a law but often simply proceeded with using the CRPD in 
the ways described above. Yet the apparent delay in enacting a new law 
seems to have provided an impetus to courts for applying the CRPD to 
enforce rights of disabled persons beyond what is guaranteed under 
                                                 
162 See for example the consideration of CRPD-compliant models of legal capacity and guardianship in 
various jurisdictions: Wayne Martin et al, ‘Is the Mental Capacity Act of England and Wales 
Compatible with the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities? If not, What Next?’ 
(2014) An Essex Autonomy Project Position Paper <http://repository.essex.ac.uk/13624/1/EAP-
Position-Paper-FINAL-copy.pdf> accessed 10 January 2016; Volker Lipp and Julian O Winn, 
‘Guardianship and Autonomy: Foes or Friends?’ (2011) 5 Journal of International Aging Law and 
Policy 41; Ron McCallum, ‘The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: 
Some Reflections’ (2010) Sydney Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 10/30 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1563883> accessed 10 January 2016.  
163 Jeeja Ghosh (n 119) [13]. 
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municipal law. In a quiet but perceivable way, the courts have thus 
strengthened the human rights basis of disability law, moving away from 
the existing welfare model adopted in the PWD Act and thus already 
laying down a strong basis for the interpretation and implementation of 
the RPD Act. Thus, cases like Ranjit Rajak, Desh Deepak Dhamija and 
National Association of the Deaf upheld the Petitioners’ claims by using 
the CRPD to broaden the scope of domestic provisions. The key to the 
judicial preference for transformative interpretation in these cases is 
Article 21 of the Constitution. The right to life enshrined in Article 21 
plays a special role in rights jurisprudence in India.164 The Supreme Court 
has held that Article 21 embodies the ‘most precious human right’ and 
‘must therefore be interpreted in a broad and expansive spirit so as to 
invest it with significance and vitality which may…enhance the dignity 
of the individual and the worth of the human person’.165 The scope of the 
sparsely worded Article 21 has thus been progressively expanded to 
include ‘the right to live with human dignity and all that goes along with 
it’, including: ‘the bare necessaries of life such as adequate nutrition, 
clothing and shelter over the head and facilities for reading, writing and 
expressing oneself in diverse forms, freely moving about and mixing and 
commingling with fellow human beings’.166 A slew of decisions have 
capitalized on this to include within Article 21, the right to timely 
emergency medical services;167 the right of livelihood;168 the right to free 
primary education;169 and the right to food which included a fair and 
efficient Public Distribution System serving those living below the 
poverty line.170 Thus, the vast reservoir of Article 21 jurisprudence has 
similarly provided an opportunity for enhancing the rights of disabled 
persons whether it was by reading in statutory rights expansively based 
on international legal commitments and Article 21 of the Constitution;171 
or where no statutory provision is available, by giving force to 
                                                 
164 See esp Maneka Gandhi v Union of India 1978 SCR (2) 621 (Supreme Court of India). See Nalini 
Kant Jha, ‘Fifty Years of Human Rights Jurisprudence in India’ in T S N Sastry (ed), Fifty Years of 
Indian Political System (APH Publications 2000).  
165 Bandhua Mukti Morcha v Union of India AIR 1984 SC 802 (Supreme Court of India). 
166 Francis Coralie Mullin v The Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi AIR 1981 SC 746, 753 
(Supreme Court of India). 
167 Paschim Banga Khet Majoor Samity v State of West Bengal (1996) 4 SCC 37 (Supreme Court of 
India). 
168 Olga Tellis (n 12). 
169 Unnikrishnan (n 143). 
170 People’s Union for Civil Liberties v Union of India (2001) 5 SCALE 303 (Supreme Court of India).  
171 Jolly George Varghese v Bank of Cochin AIR 1980 SC 470 (Supreme Court of India).  
 
 44 
international obligations via Article 21 directly.172 The courts in Social 
Jurist and Murugan seem to have adopted the former approach in 
upholding the right to education under RTE Act and right to employment 
under the PWD Act. The courts in Ranjit Rajak, Desh Deepak and 
National Association of the Deaf preferred the latter approach to enforce 
the right to work and accessibility directly under the CRPD. What 
appears from the discussion of the cases is that wherever the statutory 
basis is clear, the reliance on Article 21 and the CRPD is only a matter of 
citation (Social Jurist and Murugan), whilst the lack of a directly 
applicable statutory norm provides a ready ground for relying 
substantively on Article 21 and the CRPD (Ranjit Rajak, Desh Deepak 
and National Association of the Deaf). In either case, Article 21 carries 
extraordinary weight in finding in favour of disabled persons.  
 
The general uptake of these implications is a positive one. But 
considering the judgments which have used the CRPD in isolation can be 
misleading in understanding the full discourse on disability jurisprudence 
in India. This may be an obvious point but can be missed in the jubilation 
for strides made judicially, especially when they draw on international 
obligations. As Kannabiran rightly remarks in her extensive case analysis 
of disability-related case law: 
 
 While the case law on disability is recent and not very extensive, especially in 
comparison to the existing case law on the other indices of discrimination, a 
careful reading might foreground the theoretical/conceptual bases for the 
marginality of disability rights jurisprudence to the larger discussions of non-
discrimination in India.173 
 
Thus, neither the existing discourse nor and the new RPD Act, will be 
themselves sufficient in fully realising the CRPD. The RPD Act will have 
to independently make creative and liberal strides in enforcing the CRPD 
norms. Positive judicial engagement with the CRPD can assist this 
paradigm shift which will ultimately, with reinforcement, be brought 
about by the RPD Act.  
 
                                                 
172 Nilabati Behera v State of Orissa AIR 1993 SC 1960 (Supreme Court of India); DK Basu v State of 
West Bengal AIR 1997 SC 610 (Supreme Court of India); People’s Union for Civil Liberties v Union 
of India AIR 1997 SC 1203 (Supreme Court of India).  





This chapter has examined the judicial engagement of Indian appellate 
courts with the CRPD. The analysis of the twenty-eight cases presents a 
diverse array of approaches. Delineating them as instances of ‘citation’ 
and ‘interpretation’ explains two broad ways of either just mentioning the 
CRPD or interpreting it substantively in the judicial reasoning. Within 
these two themes there are specific ways in which citation or 
interpretation is done. Given the diversity of ways in which the CRPD 
has been invoked, coupled with the fact that the reasons for its invocation 
are not usually made apparent in the text of the judgments, no single 
consensus can be reached on when an international treaty (or the CRPD 
specifically) can be invoked and in what way. But the high success rate in 
cases where the CRPD was used and disabled persons obtained relief, 
indicates a favourable disposition to both international law as in the 
CRPD (which has only recently been enforced via a domestic legislation 
– the RPD Act 2016) and disability-friendly norms. But compared against 
the fact that the social model of disability and a human rights framework 
for disability rights are still not widely embraced, the success of these 
handful cases may be exceptional. Thus, the overall picture which 
emerges is a complex one: that the strides of Indian courts in using the 
CRPD are notable but must be seen in the light of the context wherein the 
CRPD model of disability rights had not been fully adopted in the 
country. Even so, now that the new law implementing the CRPD has 
been passed, the transformative judicial reasoning since 2007 – when 
India ratified the CRPD – appears to already have laid down substantial 
support for securing a strong legal foothold for realising the CRPD in 
India. It is then potential of the judicial work between 2007-2016 which 
we must continue to exploit as much as appreciate.  
 
 
